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Summary 
China’s unilateral pledge to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative to its 
2005 levels raises both the stringency issue, and given that China’s pledge is in the form of 
carbon intensity, reliability issues concerning China’s statistics on energy and GDP. 
Moreover, as long as China’s commitments differ in form from those of other major 
greenhouse gas emitters, China is constantly confronted with both criticism on its carbon 
intensity commitment being less stringent and the threats of trade measures. In response to 
these concerns and to put China in a positive position, this paper will map out a realistic 
roadmap for China’s specific climate commitments towards 2050, with its main 
distinguishing features including China taking on absolute emission caps around 2030 and 
the three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before that. With current 
international climate negotiations flawed with a focus on commitments on the targeted date 
of 2020 that does not accommodate well the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters, 
the paper suggests a new direction to break the current impasse in international climate 
negotiations. 
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China’s unilateral pledge to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative to 
its 2005 levels raises both the stringency issue, and given that China’s pledge is in the 
form of carbon intensity, reliability issues concerning China’s statistics on energy and 
GDP. Moreover, as long as China’s commitments differ in form from that of other major 
greenhouse gas emitters, China is constantly confronted with both criticism on its carbon 
intensity commitment being less stringent and the threats of trade measures. In response 
to these concerns and to put China in a positive position, this paper will map out a 
realistic roadmap for China’s specific climate commitments towards 2050, with its main 
distinguishing features including China taking on absolute emission caps around 2030 
and the three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before that. With 
current international climate negotiations flawed with a focus on commitments on the 
targeted date of 2020 that does not accommodate well the world’s two largest greenhouse 
gas emitters, the paper suggests a new direction to break the current impasse in 
international climate negotiations. 
 
 




JEL classification: Q42; Q43; Q48; Q52; Q53; Q54; Q58 
                                                 
1 Invited presentation at the International Conference on China’s Role in Global and 
Regional Governance, 10-11 March 2011, Singapore.   2
1. Introduction 
 
Concerned about a range of environmental problems and health risks from burning fossil 
fuels and steeply rising oil imports (Ho and Nielsen, 2007; World Bank, 2007; Zhang, 
2010a,c), China had incorporated for the first time in its five-year economic plan an input 
indicator as a constraint – requiring that energy use per unit of GDP be cut by 20 percent 
during the 11
th five-year period running from 2006 to 2010. This five-year plan also 
incorporated the goal of reducing SO2 emissions and chemical oxygen demand discharge 
by 10 percent by 2010, relative to their 2005 levels. This is widely considered an 
important step towards building a “harmonious society” through “scientific development”. 
Given that China is already the world’s largest carbon emitter (IEA, 2007; MNP, 2007; 
EIA, 2009), and its emissions continue to rise rapidly in line with its industrialization and 
urbanization, China is seen to have greater capacity, capability and responsibility for 
taking on climate commitments. Combined with great pressure both inside and outside 
international climate negotiations to be more ambitious in limiting its greenhouse gas 
emissions, just prior to the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in December 2009, 
China pledged to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative to its 2005 
levels to help to reach an international climate change agreement at Copenhagen or 
beyond. 
While this is consistent with China’s longstanding opposition to hard emission 
caps on the ground that such limits will restrict its economic growth, this marks a point of 
departure from its longstanding position on its own climate actions. The unilateral 
commitments clearly indicate China’s determination to further decouple its energy use 
and carbon emissions from economic growth. This is a welcome step towards helping to 
reach an international climate change agreement.  
China’s unilateral commitments raise the issue of whether such a pledge is 
ambitious or just represents business as usual. Moreover, as long as China’s 
commitments differ in form from that of the U.S. and other major greenhouse gas 
emitters, China is constantly confronted with both criticism on its carbon intensity 
commitment being less stringent and the threats of trade measures whenever the U.S. 
Senate is shaping its climate bill, given that the inclusion of border measures is widely 
considered the “price” for passing any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas 
emissions. Moreover, the U.S. Senate can always use China as an excuse for its own 
failure to pass a long-awaited bill to cap U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.  
This paper will first examine these issues and concerns. On this basis, the paper 
will lay out a realistic roadmap for China to 2050, with its main distinguishing features 
including China taking on absolute emission caps around 2030 and the three transitional 
periods of increasing climate obligations before that. With current international climate 
negotiations flawed with a focus on commitments on the targeted date of 2020 that does 
not accommodate well the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters, namely the U.S. 
and China, the paper concludes with a suggestion that international climate change 
negotiations need to focus on 2030 as the targeted date to cap the greenhouse gas 
emissions of the world’s two largest emitters in a legally binding global agreement. 
 
 
   3
2. China’s Carbon Intensity Pledge for 2020: Stringency and Implications 
 
2.1 Stringency Issues 
 
Zhang (2000a,b) envision that China could make a voluntary commitment to total 
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP at some point around 2020.
2 However, it is not 
until just prior to the Copenhagen Climate Chang Summit that China pledged to cut its 
carbon intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels. Wen Jiabao, 
China’s Prime Minister, made it clear at Copenhagen that China’s pledges “are 
unconditional and they are not dependent on the reduction targets of other nations” 
(Watts, 2009). 
While some question China’s willing action, real discussion has since focused on 
whether such a pledge is ambitious or just represents business as usual (e.g., Qiu, 2009; 
Carraro and Tavoni, 2010). While China considers it very ambitious, some Western 
scholars (e.g., Levi, 2009) view it just business as usual based largely on the long-term 
historical trend of China’s energy intensity.  
There are several ways to evaluate how challenging this proposed carbon intensity 
target is. One way is to see whether the proposed carbon intensity goal for 2020 is as 
challenging as the energy-saving goals set in the 11
th five-year economic blueprint. This 
involves two issues. One is rational for using energy intensity reduction as a reference. 
Given the fixed CO2 emissions coefficients of fossil fuels, which convert consumption of 
fossil fuels into CO2 emissions, and given that China’s energy mix is coal-dominated, 
cutting China’s carbon intensity is in fact cutting its energy intensity, as clearly indicated 
in Figure 1. So we can use measurable and reported data on energy use in the recent years 
to infer the stringency of China’s proposed carbon intensity target for 2020. Another 
issue requires the establishment of why the 20 percent energy-saving goal for 2010 is 
considered very challenging. China had met its aforementioned pollution-cutting goals 
ahead of the schedule. However, as discussed in Zhang (2010a,e and 2011), China had 
faced great difficulty meeting its energy-saving goal.  
In July 2010, China released its energy intensity number for 2009, and its final 
energy intensity numbers for the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, which are revised 
based on the second nationwide economic census. Based on these revised numbers, 
China’s energy intensity fell by 15.61 percent from 2006-2009 (NBS et al., 2010). The 
country would meet its energy-saving goal if it could cut its energy intensity by 4.39 
percent in 2010. However, China’s energy use rose faster than its economic growth in the 
first half of 2010, with seven provinces becoming even more energy intensive during this 
period. This suggests that the country as a whole needs to accomplish the goal set for the 
whole year only within a half year, with some provinces required to fill even big 
remaining gaps during this period. Given the annual energy-saving rate of 5.25 percent 
                                                 
2 Zhang (2000b) is the expanded version of China country paper that I initially prepared 
for the United Nations Development Programme project on Promoting Development 
while Slowing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Growth. When the draft of that China country 
paper was released, the Washington DC-based Resources for the Future made a press 
release “Is China Taking Actions to Limit Its Greenhouse Gas Emissions?”, 15 
September 1998.   4
during the period 1980-2000 in which China achieved a quadrupling of its GDP while 
cutting its energy intensity by about three quarters (Zhang, 2003), achieving such high 
energy-saving rate within a half year poses a significant challenge for the country as well 
as for those provinces that lagged behind schedule.  
To achieve the goal, it was widely reported that several provinces issued a strict 
rotation of rolling blackouts for thousands of factories that required them to shut down 
five days for every nine they operate in the second half of 2010 (Sina Net, 2010). Clearly, 
the local blackouts were not what the central government intended. While they were not 
consistent with the national policy and were not rational, it seemed that local 
governments had little choice but to take such irrational measures in such a very short 
period of time. Even if it had taken such unprecedented measures, China in the end failed 
to meet that energy-saving goal (People Net, 2011). 
Moreover, as further discussed below, these reductions in China’s energy 
intensity have already factored in the revisions of China’s official GDP data from the 
second nationwide economic census, part of the government’s continuing efforts to 
improve the quality of its statistics, whose accuracy has been questioned by both the 
general public inside of China and many analysts both inside and outside of China. Such 
revisions show that China’s economy grew faster and shifted more towards services than 
the previously estimated, thus benefiting the energy intensity indicator. Even so, it was 
still not easy for China to achieve its own set energy-saving goal. If there were no upward 
revisions of GDP data, there would be an even big gap between the target and the actual 
performance. 
All this clearly indicates that even having picked low-hanging fruit by closing 
60.06 gigawatts (GW) of small, inefficient coal-fired power plants in the past four years, 
ahead of the national schedule to decommission 50 GW of smaller and older units in the 
five years through 2010, helped China to get to where it currently stands (Zhang, 
2010a,c). However, those low-hanging fruit opportunities can only be captured once. The 
new carbon intensity target set for 2020 requires an additional 20-25 percent on top of the 
existing target. Achieving this will clearly be even more challenging and costly for China. 
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Figure 1  China’s Energy Intensity Index and Carbon Intensity Index (1980=100), 
1980-2007 
Sources: Drawn based on China Statistical Yearbook, various years, and Zhang (1997). 
 
 
Another way is to assess how substantially this carbon intensity target drives 
China’s emissions below its projected baseline levels, and whether China does its part as 
required in order to fulfill a coordinated global commitment to stabilize the concentration 
of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere at the desirable level. The World Energy 
Outlook (WEO) 2009 (IEA, 2009) has incorporated many policies into the baseline 
projection that were not incorporated in the WEO 2007 (IEA, 2007). This projection puts 
China’s baseline carbon emissions at 9.6 gigatons of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) in 2020. 
Under the ambitious 450 parts per million (ppm) of CO2 equivalent scenario, China’s 
CO2 emissions are projected to be 8.4 GtCO2 by 2020, 1.2 GtCO2 less than that in the 
baseline (IEA, 2009). Now let us put China’s proposed carbon intensity target into 
perspective. The calculations of the paper show that cutting the carbon intensity by 40-
45% over the period 2006-2020 would bring reductions of 0.46-1.2 GtCO2 in 2020, 
which are equivalent to a deviation of 4.8-12.7 percent below the WEO 2009 baseline set 
for China in 2020.  
Two key points need to be made. First, even the lower end of that range does not 
represent business as usual, because it represents a deviation of 4.8 percent below the   6
WEO 2009 baseline levels. Second, if China would be able to meet its own proposed 45 
percent carbon intensity cut, the country would cut emissions of 1.2 GtCO2 in 2020 from 
its baseline levels as is required under the ambitious 450 ppm scenario. That is equivalent 
to 31.6 percent of what the world would need to do in 2020 under the 450 ppm scenario, 
a share higher than China’s share of the world’s total CO2 emissions (28 percent in 2020). 
Clearly, the high end of China’s target, if met, aligns with the specified obligation that 
China needs to fulfill under the 450 ppm scenario. 
The previous two points clearly show that the proposed carbon intensity target 
does not just represent business as usual as some Western scholars have argued. 
 
 
2.2 Implications of China’s Carbon Intensity Pledge 
 
At Copenhagen, China eventually compromised to agree to open its emissions data to 
international consultation and analysis. The EU has identified building a robust and 
transparent emissions and performance accounting framework as a key element of 
implementing the Copenhagen Accord (European Commission, 2010). How all this will 
be worked out remains to be seen. China has not agreed to opening its GDP figures to 
international consultation and analysis. But as long as China’s commitments are in the 
form of carbon intensity, establishing a robust and transparent emissions and performance 
accounting framework is helpful, but not enough to remove international concern about 
the reliability of China’s commitments. As discussed in Zhang (2010e and 2011), the 
revisions of China’s GDP figures and energy consumption in recent years show that GDP 
figures are even more crucial to the impacts on the energy or carbon intensity than are 
energy consumption and emissions data. As shown in Table 1, such revisions lead to a 
differential between preliminary and final values as large as 123 percent for the energy 
intensity in 2006. The aforementioned revisions of China’s GDP figures reflect part of 
the government’s continuing efforts to improve the accuracy and reliability of China’s 
statistics on economic activity. While they are certainly not being calculated to make the 
energy intensity indicator look good to the government’s advantage, such revisions have 
huge implications for meeting China’s energy-saving goal in 2010 and its proposed 
carbon intensity target in 2020. 
Moreover, as long as China’s commitments differ in form from that of the U.S. 
and other major greenhouse gas emitters, China is constantly confronted with both 
criticism on its carbon intensity commitment being less stringent and the threats of trade 
measures whenever the U.S. Senate is shaping its climate bill, given that the inclusion of 
border measures is widely considered the “price” for passing any U.S. legislation capping 
its greenhouse gas emissions (Zhang, 2009 and 2010b). The U.S. Senate can always use 
China as an excuse for its own failure to pass a long-awaited bill to cap U.S. greenhouse 
gas emissions. China is also expected to face increasing pressure from the European 
Union, who will find it increasingly hard to convince its citizens in general and 
companies in particular why the EU has taken the lead but do not see China following, 
because overall competitiveness concerns mean that no country is likely to step out too 
far in front. 
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a The dates when the corresponding data were released are in parentheses.  
b Based on China’s revised 2008 GDP from the second nationwide economic census, 
released in December 2009, which raised the growth rate of GDP to 9.6 percent from the 
previously reported 9 percent for that year and the share of services in GDP. 
c Own calculation based on the National Development and Reform Commission’s 
reporting that China’s energy intensity was cut by 14.38 percent in the first four years of 
the 11
th five-year plan relative to its 2005 levels (Xinhua Net, 2010). 
d Based on China’s energy intensity number for 2009, and its final energy intensity 
numbers for the years 2005 and 2008 (NBS et al., 2010), my own calculation for this 
value would be 3.23 percent, instead of the official reported cut of 3.61 percent. 
Sources: Zhang (2010e and 2011). 
 
 
3. A Roadmap for China to 2050 
  
Indeed, in what format and under what timeframe China would take on climate 
commitments is of significant relevance to China because it is facing great pressure both 
inside and outside international climate negotiations to exhibit greater ambition and is 
being confronted with the threats of trade measures. It is of significant global relevance 
as well because when China’s emissions peak is crucial to determine when global 
emissions would peak and because what China is going to do in what format has 
significant implications for the level and ambition of commitments from other countries. 
There is no question that China eventually needs to take on binding greenhouse 
gas emissions caps. The key challenges are to decide when that would take place and to 
determine the credible interim targets that would be needed during the transition period. 
These results will no doubt be a combination of China’s own assessment of its 
responsibility, economic and political benefits, and climate change impacts, taking also 
into consideration the mounting diplomatic and international pressure and the give and 
take of international negotiations.  
In the run up to and at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in December 
2009, China took the initiative to ally with India and other major developing countries,   8
took full advantage of being the world’s largest carbon emitter, and attempted to secure a 
deal to its advantage. It is widely reported that China walked away “happy”. But that did 
not come without a high price tag. Whether to admit or not, China angered allies, 
abandoned principles that it stuck by during the two weeks of talks, and no doubt stoked 
anti-China sentiment in Western nations. The early appearance of this sentiment does not 
do China any good because it still has to evolve from a large country to a country that is 
truly strong in e.g., science, technology, innovation, economy, etc. Officially China was 
backed by allies like India and Brazil, but they admitted in private that this was mainly 
China’s battle (Graham-Harrison, 2009). 
No doubt, Copenhagen was disappointing to many, particularly given that U.S. 
President Obama pledge’s “yes, we can” had raised high expectations for that meeting. 
However, the situation could be worse because the negotiations could have completely 
collapsed. While falling far short of the legally binding global agreement, the 
Copenhagen Accord reflects a political consensus on the main elements of the future 
framework among the major emitters and representatives of the main negotiating groups. 
For the first time, China was blamed for dragging its feet on international climate 
negotiations, previously the accusations always targeted at the U.S.. French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy publicly criticized China, saying that China was impeding progress in 
climate talks (Watts, 2009). British Energy and Climate Change Secretary Ed Miliband 
(2009) wrote in The Guardian that “We did not get an agreement on 50 per cent 
reductions in global emissions by 2050 or on 80 per cent reductions by developed 
countries. Both were vetoed by China, despite the support of a coalition of developed and 
the vast majority of developing countries”. A furious Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, 
demanded that “Why can’t we even mention our own targets?”. Kevin Rudd, Australian 
Prime Minister, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone. Brazil’s representative also 
pointed out how illogical China’s position was (Lynas, 2009). Being asked in the early 
hours of 19 December 2009 why a pledge that applied only to rich nations and to which 
all those nations seemed to agree could have vanished from the final document, the 
spokesperson for the Swedish government that was serving the EU Presidency at that 
time gave the flat reply after the seconds of what-can-I-say silence: “China didn’t like 
numbers.” (The Economist, 2010). 
It is not so hard to understand why China rejected the aforementioned two 
numbers. The needing to cut both global greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent and that 
of industrialized countries by 80 percent by 2050 means that emissions in developing 
countries are only allowed to increase by 15 percent by 2050 relative to their 1990 levels. 
Given their very low levels in 1990, China considers this unacceptable. There could be a 
misinterpretation here. Some may interpret that a 15 percent increase by 2050 would 
mean that the developing country’s emissions are allowed to only increase by 15 percent 
in any specific year from now on to 2050. This is not correct. Emissions in developing 
countries can be much higher than the level allowed by a 15 percent increase prior to 
2050 and then come down to that proposed allowable level by 2050. Indeed, under the 
450 parts per million of CO2 equivalent scenario, CO2 emissions in China are projected to 
go from 2.2 GtCO2 in 1990 and 6.1 GtCO2 in 2007 to 8.4 GtCO2 in 2020, while the 
corresponding figures for India are estimated to go from 0.6 GtCO2 in 1990 and 1.3 
GtCO2 in 2007 to 1.9 GtCO2 in 2020 (IEA, 2009). Relative to their levels in 1990 and 
2007, CO2 emissions in 2020 increase by 282 percent and 37 percent for China and by   9
117 percent and 46 percent for India, respectively. More importantly, rejecting a long-
standing, widely reported proposal without putting forward alternatives cast China in a 
very bad light. It led to the impression that rich countries should not even announce their 
unilateral cut, which was at least reported by the Western media.
3 
In response to these concerns and to put China in a positive position, I propose 
that at current international climate negotiations China should negotiate a requirement 
that greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized countries be cut at least by 80 percent by 
2050 relative to their 1990 levels and that per capita emissions for all major countries by 
2050 should be no more than the world’s average at that time. Moreover, it would be in 
China’s own best interest if, at the right time (e.g., at a time when the U.S. Senate is 
going to debate and ratify any global deal that would emerge from current international 
climate negotiations), China signals well ahead that it will take on binding absolute 
emission caps around the year 2030.
4 While this date is later than the time frame that the 
U.S. and other industrialized countries would like to see, it would probably still be too 
soon from China’s perspective.  
However, it is hard to imagine how China could apply the brakes so sharply as to 
switch from rapid emissions growth to immediate emissions cuts, without passing 
through several intermediate phases. After all, China is still a developing country, no 
matter how rapidly it is expected to grow in the future. Taking the commitment period of 
five years that the Kyoto Protocol has adopted, I envision that China needs the following 
three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations, before taking on absolute 
emissions caps. 
 
Further credible energy conservation commitments starting 2013 
China has already committed itself to quantified targets on energy conservation and the 
use of clean energy. It needs to extend its level of ambition, further making credible 
quantified domestic commitments in these areas for the second commitment period and 
aiming for a 46-50 percent cut in its carbon intensity by 2020 (Zhang, 2010c,e). 
 
Voluntary “no lose” emission targets starting 2018 
During this transition period, China could commit to adopting voluntary emission 
reduction targets. Emissions reductions achieved beyond these “no lose” targets would 
then be eligible for sale through carbon trading at the same world market price as those of 
developed countries whose emissions are capped, relative to the lower prices that China 
currently receives for carbon credits generated from clean development mechanism 
projects, meaning that China would suffer no net economic loss by adhering to the targets. 
 
Binding carbon intensity targets starting 2023, leading to emissions caps around 2030 
                                                 
3 Some of China’s stance and reactions at Copenhagen are generally well rooted because 
of realities at home. Some reactions could have been handled more effectively for a better 
image of China, provided that there were good preparations and deliberations. See Zhang 
(2010d) for further discussion on China’s stance and reactions at Copenhagen. 
4 See Zhang (2010b,f and 2011) for detailed discussion on why around 2030 is 
considered the timing for China to take on absolute greenhouse gas emissions caps.    10
While it is expected to incorporate the carbon intensity target as a domestic commitment 
for the first time in its 12
th five-year plan period starting 2011, China adopting binding 
carbon intensity targets in 2023 as its international commitment would be a significant 
step towards committing to absolute emissions caps during the subsequent commitment 
period. At that juncture, having been granted three transition periods, China could then be 
expected to take on binding emissions caps, starting around 2030 and to aim for the 
global convergence of per capita emissions by 2050.  
Overall, this proposal is a balanced reflection of respecting China’s rights to grow 
and recognizing China’s growing responsibility for increasing greenhouse gas emissions 
as the standards of living increase over time. The commitments envisioned for China are 
basic principles. They leave ample flexibility for China to work out the details, as 
international climate change negotiations move onward. The value of this proposal lies in 
the format and timeframe under which China would be included in a post-2012 climate 
change regime, not in the numerical details. It should not be taken for granted that China 
can take on such increasingly stringent commitments, because that would entail 
significant efforts to cut China’s projected emissions below its baselines. Political reality 
may limit the ability of the U.S. to take on significant emissions cuts by 2020 that 
developing countries called for, but as a tradeoff, the U.S. should significantly scale up its 
technology transfer and deployment, financing and capacity building to enable China to 
do that. This is at the least what the U.S. could and should do, and by example can 
encourage other developed counties to do the same. As Winston Churchill said, “[you] 
can always count on the Americans to do the right thing – after exhausting every other 
alternative.” After what is viewed as eight years of lost time under U.S. President Bush, 
the whole world bets that U.S. will not disappoint us this time. Only history will tell us 
whether that will be the case. 
In the meantime, commitments by China would send a signal well in advance that 
China is seriously committed to addressing climate change issues. They will also 
alleviate, if not completely remove, U.S. and other industrialized country’s concerns 
about when China will join them, an indication that the world has long awaited from 
China, and help U.S. to take on long-expected emissions commitments, thus paving the 
way for reaching a post-2012 international climate change agreement.  
 
 
4. A New Direction of Future International Climate Negotiations 
 
However, current international climate negotiations have been focused on commitments 
on the targeted date of 2020. With the commitment period only up to 2020, there is very 
little room left for the U.S. and China, although for reasons very different from each other. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) calls for cutting global 
greenhouse gas emissions at least in half by 2050. To achieve that goal, the IPCC fourth 
assessment report recommends that global greenhouse gas emissions should peak by 
2020 at the latest and then turn downward in order to avoid dangerous climate change 
consequences, calling for developed countries to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 
25-40 percent by 2020 relative to their 1990 levels (IPCC, 2007). This recommendation 
was incorporated into the Bali Roadmap at the United Nations Climate Summit in 2007. 
This seems a logical choice. Once the long-term goal (namely the target for 2050) is set,   11
one needs a mid-term goal to help facilitate the long-term one. From then, the 
negotiations on industrialized countries’ commitments have been on what emissions 
reduction targets would be in 2020.  
However, 2020 is just around the corner. More importantly, this date does not 
accommodate well the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters, namely the U.S. and 
China. Because the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, it has not made any 
substantial preparations to cut emissions as other Kyoto-constrained industrialized 
countries have done over the past decade. Whether you like it or not, this is a political 
reality. It is very hard for an unprepared country like the U.S. to take on a substantial 
emissions cut in 2020 as developing countries have demanded, although it should on a 
moral ground. 
In the meantime, China overtook the U.S. to become the world’s largest 
greenhouse gas emitter in 2007, at least twenty years earlier than what was estimated by 
the U.S. EIA (2004) as late as 2004. The IEA (2009) estimates that about half of the 
growth of global energy-related CO2 emissions until 2030 will come from China. 
Combined with huge trade deficit with China, the U.S. has pushed for China to take on 
emissions caps as early as 2020. Otherwise, the goods exported from China to U.S. 
markets might be subject to carbon tariffs (Zhang, 2010b and 2011). However, as argued 
in Zhang (2010b,f and 2011), the year 2020 is not a realistic date for China to take on the 
absolute emissions cap, because its carbon emissions would be still on the climbing 
trajectories beyond 2030, even if some energy saving policies and measures have been 
factored into such projections. Meanwhile, taking on commitments for 2050 seems too 
far away for politicians. 
If the commitment period is extended to 2030, it would really open the possibility 
for the U.S. and China to make the commitments that each wants from the other in the 
same form, although the scale of reductions would differ from each other. By 2030, the 
U.S. will be able to commit to much deeper emission cuts that China and developing 
countries have demanded, while, as argued in Zhang (2010b,f and 2011), China would 
have approached the threshold to take on the absolute emission cap that the U.S. and 
other industrialized countries have long asked for.  
Being aware of his proposed provisional target in 2020 well below what is 
internationally expected from the U.S., President Obama announced a provisional target 
of a 42 percent reduction below 2005 levels in 2030 to demonstrate the U.S. continuing 
commitments and leadership to find a global solution to the threat of climate change. 
While the U.S. proposed level of emission reductions for 2030 is still not ambitious 
enough, President Obama inadvertently points to the right direction of international 
climate negotiations. Namely, international climate negotiations need to look at the 
targeted date of 2030. If international negotiations could lead to much deeper emission 
cuts for developed countries as well as the absolute emission caps for major developing 
countries in 2030, that would significantly reduce the legitimacy of the U.S. proposed 
carbon tariffs and, if implemented, their prospect for withstanding a challenge before 
World Trade Organization. That will also alleviate concern about when China’s 
greenhouse gas emissions will peak and what China is going to do in what format. More 
importantly, it really opens the possibility to cap the greenhouse gas emissions of the 
world’s two largest emitters in a legally binding global agreement. 
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